Refinery Attacks and North Korea
Let’s start with the increasing number of refinery attacks. This is the latest; it happened overnight. They matter because Russia not only needs the gas for the war machine; Russia is a petro-state. Even with sanctions, it is the best way to get hard currency. So this matters:
In Russia, on the night of June 18, in addition to the oil depot in Azov, Rostov region, an oil depot in the Temryuk district of the Krasnodar Territory was also attacked. This was reported by the Russian publication ASTRA. There are no photos of objective control yet, and yes, the attack on the oil depot is extremely good. Still, something else is curious: this is a message about another attack using Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles.
This is not the first time we have heard about these missiles attacking ground targets in the Russian Federation; there have also previously been official statements from Ukraine about their use. And yesterday, the Ukrainian military portal Defense Express published interesting photos from the Ukrainian pavilion at the Eurosatory 2024 exhibition in France, where you can see interesting, unnamed, cruise missiles.
As I have said many times, Ukraine needs to achieve an independent (independent of arms supply) ability to hit Moscow with accurate and powerful weapons — these are cruise and ballistic missiles. Russia, as a hyper-centralized state, concentrates all the most important things in the capital. The ability to threaten Moscow with missiles is the most important trump card that Kyiv must gain.
Now another detail emerged from this. It was one telling detail for this old emergency responder:
Fighting the fire as a result of the strike on Azov oil depot continues — the declared burning area is 3.2 thousand square meters.
❗️A fire engine, 208 people and 39 units of special equipment were involved in extinguishing the fire.
One engine is not enough. It would be best if you had more to pump foam into that fire. You also need engines just to pump water into intact tanks to cool them. This tells me Russia doesn’t have enough working engines, or at least enough in Azov. The video shows classic incident commands, though. I guess we transferred ICS to them at some point.
I did watch the video a few times. One engine was working the fire. They also had a ladder, two more parked engines, and a battalion chief car visible. Situations like this call for the generous use of foam, the PFAS foam that at this point is getting withdrawn from service in the United States due to its ties to cancer. I doubt Russians have replacements.
You also use water to cool other tanks to prevent them from failing. But let’s look at this from an emergency responder hat. This is not the first time I have seen fire grounds that remind me of fire departments in the developing world that lack fire engines. This is just the latest.
Do they have enough equipment? With the parked engines, are they trying to save the rolling stock because they seem to be using ground-based semi-portable pumpers? They did have the number of fire personnel for at least two companies but not enough rolling stock.
There have been rumors that due to corruption, the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations does not have enough equipment. Chiefly, how many of these engines are sidelined because they are Western in origin and are not getting spare parts? Yes, this equipment, like pumps, is used double by the military.
Now, let’s turn to North Korea. For this, I will lean on Volymedia because they have the most interesting take on this:
Whatever the strategy, such are the partners. Why is Putin* going to the DPRK? Part 1
North Korea has one of the largest arsenals of artillery shells, mines and ballistic missiles. Moreover, shells, mines, and missiles are perfectly compatible with Russian weapons. Which is not at all surprising, since the military industry and army of the DPRK were once created with the active participation of the USSR.
Since 2023, the Russian Armed Forces have been receiving North Korean shells, mines for mortars (as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel mines), and ballistic missiles compatible with Iskander-M launchers. KN-23 missiles, which are an analogue of the Russian 9M723, have already been used in Ukraine.
In 2023, then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu flew to Pyongyang to negotiate the supply of the ammunition listed above. During the negotiations, they discussed several million 152 mm and 125 mm shells for tank guns. By June 1, 2024, the DPRK had supplied about 5 million such ammunition to the Russian Federation.
During the same period, the Russian Federation received more than 200 Korean ballistic missiles (the exact number is unknown, but sources in the Russian Defense Ministry talk about 200–500 units). This allowed the Russian defense industry to produce and stockpile a certain number of missiles of its own production. Since the beginning of May 2024, it is noticeable that the intervals between Russian missile attacks on Ukraine have been reduced by almost half.
Also, at the expense of the DPRK, the Russian Armed Forces were able to maintain a stock of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, which had been seriously used up since the beginning of the war and especially in the spring-summer of 2023 on the southern front.
Russian artillerymen and tank crews complain about North Korean shells. Some of them are frankly old and unsuitable for use, some do not explode when hit, some require modifications, most often homemade ones, which often lead to damage to the gun barrel or (less often) to the rupture of the projectile in the barrel.
The Ukrainian military told us about the Russians using North Korean shells in many directions, especially in Bakhmut. Cases were also recorded there when shells fell near the target, but did not explode. The Ukrainian defenders of Kleshcheevka and Andreevka (villages south of Bakhmut) faced this in particular.
Despite the low quality, the Russian Armed Forces, due to the volume of supplies and the DPRK, were able to provide themselves with a high intensity of artillery fire, due to which they advanced on Avdievka and continue to advance now in several directions at once.
If supplies have already been established, why did Putin fly to the DPRK* and why was the draft strategic partnership agreement prepared? As our interlocutors in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff say, to set up an industrial base in North Korea for the production of not only shells and missiles, but also ammunition for small arms, dynamic protection and other materials necessary for war. Before the signing of the partnership agreement, the DPRK supplied what was stored in weapons and ammunition warehouses. Now it will supply fresh products, the production and quality control of which may include Russian specialists. In any case, this is exactly what the Ministry of Defense is now preparing for, gathering production workers and artillery specialists for long business trips to North Korea.
Russian staff officers in the combat zone are anticipating other help. For example, the arrival of North Korean “volunteers” to the war, with whom it will be possible to storm Ukrainian positions. But sources in the Ministry of Defense and common sense say that these dreams will remain dreams. The DPRK has 1.4 million soldiers and officers, but it makes no sense to send them thousands of kilometers away. Korean units will be subordinate only to Korean commanders, in addition, the DPRK does not consider it possible to weaken its army within the country.
@Volyamedia
No, North Korean Shells are not that great. However, they are sent in large volumes. Without these, Russia would have more of an issue at this point. My ear perked up at troops. No, North Korean troops are not thought to be that high quality. However, they would provide mass. In this war, mass is king.
However, North Korea seems not in the mood to transfer those troops. Perhaps they fear mass desertion? Or, truly, they need them to keep South Korea and the US at bay.
This is your daily reminder that North Korea engages in provocations often. Most don’t make it to the Western press. Some are just funny. Like sending poop balloons across the DMZ. However, they did have consequences.
Here is the second post that also caught my attention:
Whatever the strategy, such are the partners. Why is Putin* going to the DPRK? Part 2
The DPRK’s interest in a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation is understandable. The country needs currency, it needs energy sources, fuel. Another interest of Pyongyang in Moscow is dictated by the belief that the Russian Federation has preserved and not lost the achievements of Soviet cosmonautics. North Korea needs help and resources to launch its own satellites. They cannot yet cope with this task on their own.
Considering the “successes” of Roscosmos, it is unlikely that the DPRK will receive the help it is counting on, but the Koreans will learn about this only after they begin cooperation.
The beginning of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons is also possible. Moreover, energy is a more likely option. The Russian delegation will include representatives of Rosatom, possibly in an unofficial status, so as not to frighten South Korea, Japan and the United States ahead of time.
There is another reason for Putin*’s trip to Pyongyang. This is the involvement of the DPRK in trilateral cooperation with the Russian Federation and China. China has long been persuading Moscow and Pyongyang to open passage for Chinese military and commercial ships to the Sea of Japan through the Tumangan River. China was ready to invest effort and resources in expanding the river bed and replacing outdated bridges across it with modern ones that would not interfere with navigation. Invest in infrastructure development in areas adjacent to the river.
In the 2000s and 1900s, the Russian Federation showed no interest in such cooperation, but now circumstances have changed. During Putin*’s recent visit to China, representatives of several northern Russian regions, including governors, arrived with him. Their participation in the negotiations was explained by China’s great interests in the development of the Northern Sea Route and port infrastructure along its entire length. There was also talk about China’s involvement in the construction of chemical plants near new and old northern ports in the Russian Federation. According to one of the participants in that trip, the parties reached preliminary agreements and in the summer-autumn of 2024 Chinese representatives will come to several northern regions of the Russian Federation to see with their own eyes what and with whom they will have to work.
Allowing China to the Northern Sea Route is a much more serious decision for the Russian Federation than allowing China to access the Sea of Japan through the Tumangan River. If they go for the first, then they will go for the second.
The demonstrative rapprochement of the Russian Federation with the DPRK will help Putin* play his favorite game — to scare the “Western wimps”. The Russian Federation, both before the war in Ukraine and after it began, constantly supports terrorists, fundamentalists and dictators around the world. This forces the EU and the US to spend additional resources trying to keep track of everything, and most importantly, creates the illusion of Russian power. The Russian Federation is creating hotbeds of tension in Africa, the Middle East, and is trying to create them in Southeast Asia. Now another such outbreak will begin to smoke in the immediate vicinity of South Korea and Japan. In recent years, North Korea has become increasingly worse at playing the role of a bogeyman. With Russian resources and money, the Scarecrow of Kim Jong-un will be a sight for sore eyes.
If the DPRK becomes involved in a military partnership with the Russian Federation, then in the future this will mean a revival of hope for the collapse of the North Korean regime. Which will inevitably happen after Putin’s Russia collapses.
@Volyamedia
The freedom of navigation in the Tumangan River will raise important strategic considerations for Japan. It also points to the creation of an alliance against the West.
Then there is the idea that it shows Russians that Moscow does not need the West. It’s a go-back to the past of the USSR. There are also rumors now that Russia will cede some of the Far East back to China. I am not the only one thinking that China wants to return former Chinese territories, including the port of Vladivostok, to Chinese control.
For the moment, it’s an economic takeover. But as Russia gets weaker, they should make their move in time. There are vast resources that China could exploit in the Far East. They can also colonize the land.
Oh, and Vladivostok, critical for the Russian Pacific fleet, can remain usable even in the winter months. That would be a significant strategic loss for the motherland.
Now, there are signals that Western democracies are waking up to Russia. This post tells me that we are starting to consider sanctions on Beijing:
“90% of Russian microelectronics comes from China”, — Stoltenberg.
❗️”Beijing cannot have both. At some point, if China does not change course, allies must make it pay. There must be consequences. China is working to improve the capabilities of Russian satellites”, he added.
So now we are having this openly discussed. We are quickly falling into camps because we are already in a global conflict. Camps are clear. Modern democratic states and authoritarian states.