War is Changing: It's Heading Underground
Any major war sees the evolution of war into new ways of war. Sometimes, these are old ways revived to new circumstances. So let me start you slowly on this, and I will use three posts from Yigal Levin. But I think it’s important to become aware because I fear the days of fast maneuvering are probably over.
This post (and yes, there is a video attached of the collector pipe getting hit) is a good example of flanking. That is not new. What is new is using this kind of cover. Russians are using cover to try unsuccessfully) to hide from drones. Drones have become pervasive in the new battlefield of Ukraine. So, hiding from them is a matter of survival. If you will, the world of Terminator is here:
A collector pipe in Chasov Yar, which the invaders are trying to use to get behind the rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A similar situation occurred during the battle for Avdievka, which had dire consequences for the defense of the city. As the Black Swan UAV strike unit of the 225th Assault Battalion writes:
“This post is about the importance of learning lessons. Especially when a high price is paid for them. The occupiers are trying to use the pipe in Chasov Yar to repeat their past success. But, as you can see from its condition, we are working with mortars and discharges, methodically turning the pipe into a collective grave. The mortar penetrates the structure, and from a height of 200–250 meters we constantly keep the pipe under fire control, accurately dropping surprises for those who like to walk through shit. Judging by the interceptions, we are working successfully.”
The ability to hit the same point twice with such and such “ballistics” of ammunition — this video is very underrated. Post on the sniper operators page .
Then there is this other post regarding the evolution of war in Ukraine:
An interesting excursion from the Ukrainian artilleryman Volodymyr Omelchenko into the tactics of using artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: about the radical change in this tactics dictated by changes in the war. As Omelchenko concludes:
2022: The first year of the war was a phase of mobility, the motto of which was “move or die.” In addition, it was a year of big goals: columns, large concentrations of manpower and equipment. During this period, the enemy had a lot of artillery fire, but it was “in areas” and the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to maintain parity due to their efficiency and accuracy. Mostly Valkyries and Leleki were flying in the sky, and there were few Maviks, although by the end of the year their number had increased significantly: “Whoever interacted better and more efficiently and controlled various art systems won.” Plus, the first Western howitzers, such as the M777 and the M109 self-propelled guns, helped change the balance of power.
2023: the speed factor of self-propelled guns has ceased to be decisive, since self-propelled guns have stopped moving: the enemy has Lancets appearing en masse, which puts the entire brigade artillery on hold. If in 22 the task of the Ukrainians was to constantly move, then in 23 they should not have moved at all if possible. The number of reconnaissance drones is growing sharply, and at the end of 2023 FPVs are appearing en masse: “Every centimeter of the front becomes visible, we bury and close our guns in caponiers, thereby losing mobility and speed of response.” At the same time, the direction of cannon artillery fire began to be limited by the anti-drone frame. Moreover, Western artillery systems with a long range, such as 2S22, Ceasar, PzH 2000 or Archer, “only to a small extent compensate for the poor effectiveness of the artillery of mechanized brigades.” Plus, the enemy has become much better at digging in and camouflaging: “to dismantle one dugout, 20 155-mm shells are spent, which does not guarantee ultimate success.” And large concentrations of enemy forces and assets at a distance of 20 km from the front line have not been observed for a long time.
Conclusions: In conditions of such positional warfare, the effectiveness of the BM-21 Grad becomes critically low, plus there is a shortage of 122-mm rockets. Jet divisions are being disbanded, leaving separate batteries, but there is still no alternative to the Grads. The effectiveness of barrel artillery is also decreasing: “It is not because of a good life that drops and FPV drones are becoming the main means of destruction. In our direction, they account for 80% of destroyed enemy targets.” However, there are new tasks for classical artillery — this is work in positional defense: “Do not break up the enemy’s attacking columns, but through systematic and permanent work, prevent the enemy from carrying out his offensive.” At the same time, in the Kharkov region, worthy goals began to appear again. And most importantly, according to the author of the analysis: “Where there are no alternatives to artillery at all, this is in our future offensive.”
This should be familiar to any student of the Western Front in the First World War. What is old is new again. The eastern front remained much less static, but armies dug in within months of the German offensive in the west. That line mainly remained static for most of the war.
Remember what I said about drones? Digging in is part of that effort to survive. What broke this impasse in World War One were a few things:
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